Course syllabus for Game theory

Course syllabus adopted 2026-02-26 by Head of Programme (or corresponding).

Overview

  • Swedish nameSpelteori
  • CodeTEK670
  • Credits7.5 Credits
  • OwnerTKTEM
  • Education cycleSecond-cycle
  • Main field of studyIndustrial Engineering and Management, Mathematics
  • ThemeMTS 7.5 c
  • DepartmentTECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS
  • GradingTH - Pass with distinction (5), Pass with credit (4), Pass (3), Fail

Course round 1

  • Teaching language English
  • Application code 59132
  • Open for exchange studentsNo
  • Only students with the course round in the programme overview.

Credit distribution

0126 Examination 7.5 c
Grading: TH		 7.5 c

In programmes

Examiner

Eligibility

General entry requirements for Master's level (second cycle)
Applicants enrolled in a programme at Chalmers where the course is included in the study programme are exempted from fulfilling the requirements

Specific entry requirements

English 6 (or by other approved means with the equivalent proficiency level)
Applicants enrolled in a programme at Chalmers where the course is included in the study programme are exempted from fulfilling the requirements

Aim

This course introduces foundational concepts of Game Theory and explores their applications in engineering, economics, ethics, and public policy.

Learning outcomes (after completion of the course the student should be able to)

Knowledge and Understanding
• Explain fundamental concepts of rational decision-making under certainty, under uncertainty and over time.
• Describe the structure and properties of static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information.
• Explain key solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and Bayesian equilibrium.
• Identify applications of game theory in engineering, economics, ethics, and public policy.
• Give examples of ethical issues related to strategic interaction in technology and society.

Competence and Skills
• Apply game-theoretic principles to analyze strategic interactions in engineering and economic contexts.
• Illustrate game structures using normal-form and extensive-form representations.
• Compute equilibria in pure and mixed strategies for static and dynamic games.
• Distinguish between different equilibrium concepts and their implications for strategic behavior.
 
Judgement and Approach
• Assess the limitations and assumptions of game-theoretic models in practical applications.
• Reflect on ethical aspects of strategic decision-making, including fairness and sustainability.
• Criticize new technology solutions or innovation strategies, as well as policy proposals, in terms of how they align with incentives and societal goals.

Content

The course covers various topics in game theory with applications including, but not limited to:

Rational Decision Making
• The Single-Person Decision Problem
• Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty and Over Time

Static Games of Complete Information
• Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies
• Dominance in Pure Strategies
• Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies
• Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability
• Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs
• Nash Equilibrium in Pure and Mixed Strategies
• Nash’s Existence Theorem

Dynamic Games of Complete Information
• Strategies and Nash Equilibrium in the Extensive-Form Games
• Nash Equilibrium and Paths of Play
• Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction
• Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
• Multistage Games and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
• Repeated Games and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
• The Folk Theorem: Almost Anything Goes

Static Games of Incomplete Information
• Bayesian Games
• Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Mechanism Design and The Revelation Principle
• Dominant Strategies and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms

Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
• Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information
• Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibrium

Organisation

Lectures and exercises 

Literature

The course literature will be announced no later than 12 weeks before the start of the course

Examination including compulsory elements

Written exam. Examination may also include written and oral presentation of exercises/assignments.

The course examiner may assess individual students in other ways than what is stated above if there are special reasons for doing so, for example if a student has a decision from Chalmers about disability study support.

Game theory | Chalmers